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THE AGRA
SUMMIT- AN ASSESSMENT
The recent India Pakistan talks from July 14- 16, 2001 in Agra, popularly
known as the Agra Summit, has produced a range of unexpected results. At the
outset, the government of India agreed to talk with the military government
of Pakistan. Soon after the Kargil operations of 1999 and the military take
over by President Musharraf in Pakistan, India had demanded that cross
border terrorism should be put to an end before any bilateral discussions.
Nevertheless with the background of President Musharraf as the architect of
the Kargil operations who was also not favourably disposed towards the
Lahore Declaration India extended an invitation. As a good-will gesture
India unilaterally announced the following CBMs:
- Pakistani fishermen straying by mistake in the Indian
waters will not be arrested. Those arrested will be released
soon.
- In the economic sector, tariff would be reduced on
50 products this is despite the fact that Pakistan has not
given MFN status to India.
- Twenty scholarships would be extended to Pakistani
students for studies in technical institutions in Indian.
Pakistan ,on the other hand, had released Vikas Singh
who had been arrested in Pakistan while on a world peace
mission on his bicycle. Shortly before the summit General
Pervez Musharaff, the Chief Executive of Pakistan, assumed
the title of the President of the country. The move was
perceived by the political watchers as an effort by the
General to give a civilian face to his government. His coming
to India as the President of the country and not as a military
ruler was seen to portray an image of a leader who had acceptance
of the people and not only the defence forces. President
Musharraf's arrival in India was a much publicised event.
President's visit to Mahatma Gandhi's Samadhi, the first
ever by any Pakistani heads of the state, was seen as a
symbolic gesture by the press and media as a sincere man
giving reverence to the Father of the Indian nation. The
visit to his ancestral home in Delhi was another event highlighted
by the media as a military man in civilian clothes, who
was at ease in meeting the common man. The media savvy General
was forthright in airing his views and opinions to the Press.
The Summit brought forth the differing focus and perceptions
of the two countries. India intended to discuss the entire
gamut of relations ranging from CBMs to economic and political
issues, nuclear risk reduction and other areas which were
identified by the two countries in the Lahore Declaration
in addition to Kashmir. However, Pakistan insisted that
`Kashmir was the core issue to the Indo- Pak dispute and
until it is resolved, talks on other issues such as economic
cooperation and CBMs were pointless'. Pakistan had already
started showing its interest on Kashmir as the main topic
for discussion much before the talks.
Some days prior to summit President Musharraf said in an
interview to the Press in Islamabad that " we have been
talking about trade, commercial ties, economic relations
and cultural relations, of improving communications between
the two countries. That is putting the cart before the horse
and ignoring Kashmir. This cannot be done." He also showed
his keenness to meet the Hurriyat leaders in India. Pakistan
had spelt out the focus and direction on which the talks
should concentrate. He proposed a four step mechanism to
approach Kashmir dispute.
- Initiate dialogue.
- Recognise Kashmir as the main issue of dispute between
the two countries.
- Negation of options unacceptable to India and Pakistan
and examine possible solutions.
- Tripartite discussion on Kashmir between India, Pakistan
and the people of Kashmir.
Showing its readiness to discuss Kashmir, India pointed
out that the issue of cross border terrorism needed to be
discussed in dealing with Kashmir. This was not acceptable
to Pakistan. President Musharraf refused to accept that
Pakistan was aiding and abetting the cross border terrorism.
In his meeting with the editors of the Press in Agra, President
Musharraf said that Pakistan was not encouraging violence
in Kashmir and that it was `an indigenous freedom struggle'.
He tried to give recognition to the Hurriyat representatives
as the representatives of the Kashmiris by meeting them
at a tea party organised by the High Commissioner of Pakistan
in New Delhi. The reaction of some of the militant oufits
operating from Pakistan was tough. Hizbul Mujahideen said
that the break down of the talk would lead to escalation
of violence in Jammu and Kashmir. It blamed India for the
failure of the talks. Jamaat- e- Islami appreciated the
stand taken by President Musharraf at the summit. Harkat-e-Jehad-e
Islami asked Musharraf to wage war against India to resolve
Kashmir dispute.
Analysis
The Agra summit ended with the two sides
not being able to agree on a Joint statement or declaration.
Five rounds of talks between the two leaders could not break
the ice. However, the summit reconfirmed the differing approaches
to deal with issues which affect their relations. On the positive
side, Musharraf and Vajpayee would have understood each other's
point of view. They would have a clearer idea of each other's
power and willingness to make the necessary compromises, if
a solution to the Kashmir issue is to be found. They would
have realised each other's political compulsions. Gen. Musahrraf,
whose experience of dealing with India was confined to military
operations, has seen at close quarters the Indian political
leadership and its approach to India- Pakistan relationship.
He would have found the Indian public response to his visit
a pleasant experience. The Indian side has come face to face with
a confident- perhaps overconfident- military mind grappling
with Pakistan's serious challenges of political freedom, economic
growth and sectarian strife. They have sized up Musharraf's
ability and willingness to reign in the fundamentalist militant
organisations operating from inside Pakistan. His argument
that armed violence in Jammu and Kashmir is entirely indigenous
in nature has shown his disregard for the realities of the
situation and for international opinion. It was expected that
President Musharraf would bring his military asset of clear
thinking to bear on the deeper need to move India Pakistan
relationship to a stable threshold. The shared interests of
both nations and of the region were expected to motivate his
visit to India. It is unfortunate that he could succeed in
projecting himself no better than his military predecessors.
Kargil confirmed that General Musharraf had misunderstood
the strategic outcome of a military action. Agra reinforces
the belief that President Musharraf could not grasp the strategic
opportunity to place Pakistan on a new course. The two countries
have , however, taken the position that they will continue
with the dialogue process. There in lies the hope for the
future of India- Pakistan relationship. In the meanwhile,
violence in Jammu and Kashmir has escalated. Pakistan has
given up maintaining restraint on the Line of Control. It
has recommenced the firing to which Indian troops have responded. |